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Abstract 
 
This article analyses British and American justifications for military intervention in 
the decade following 9/11. Taking Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011 as the main 
case studies, the article explores the ways in which political elites attempt to achieve 
policy dominance through rhetorical coercion, whereby potential opponents are left 
unable to formulate a socially sustainable rebuttal. Specifically, in these case studies, 
we explore the use of strategic rhetorical balancing, whereby secondary rationales for 
intervention are emphasised as part of a tactic of justification designed to secure 
doubters’ acquiescence by narrowing the discursive space in which an alternative 
counter-narrative could be successfully and sustainably formulated. 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
In the changing geostrategic context of the early twenty-first century, as the world 
moved from War on Terror to Arab Spring, the language of intervention shifted in 
line with the politics of the moment, despite the fact that interventionist foreign 
policies remained worryingly static.  Just as the ‘War on Terror’ was perceived to 
grant Blair and Bush right and reason to lecture states ‘harbouring’ terrorists, the Arab 
Spring was, once again, interpreted to afford political elites a platform to demarcate 
oppressed citizen from oppressive ruler.  And, as before, this demarcation enabled 
western (coalition) military intervention in non-western states. What changed was the 
manner in which such policies were justified for British and American publics.  This 
article explores these shifts in justification, finding them to be driven by a consistent 
logic: a desire to win a ‘war of position’ at home.  We argue that instrumental 
considerations, conditioned by the context of recent events and public perceptions of 
them, inspire the linguistic choices of political elites.  The empirical evidence for this 
argument is found in British and American justifications for intervention in 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011.  Uniquely, this article undertakes a discourse 
analysis of elite language in order to explore the ways in which secondary 
justifications for intervention have been emphasised in making the case for war.  We 
argue that this emphasis can usefully be understood as an attempt to coerce and 
acquiesce potential domestic opponents, as elites strategically balance their rhetoric in 
order to win a war of position through the silencing of alternatives.2   
 
                                                        
1 We would like to thank the journal editors, two anonymous referees and participants at the 2012 
BISA-ISA conference for their feedback. 
2 We use the term ‘strategic rhetorical balancing’ as entirely distinct from theories pertaining to a 
balance of power.  
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Structured in two sections, the article begins by conceptualising the role of language 
in achieving policy dominance at home.  Here, we outline the article’s theoretical 
contribution to an emerging critical constructivist literature.  We draw on Gramsci’s 
notion of a ‘war of position’, as well as recent critical constructivist work on 
rhetorical coercion.  Succinctly, our argument is that elites act instrumentally in 
attempting to achieve policy dominance at home.  While invocations of the national 
interest remain paramount, political elites also pursue a crucial strategy of strategic 
rhetorical balancing. This strategy is central to a tactic of justification that attempts to 
close down the space in which an alternative stance can sustainably be taken. In the 
second section, the article makes its empirical contribution, contrasting American and 
British justifications for intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011.  In 
Afghanistan and Libya, American and British political elites have sought a ‘balance 
of rhetoric’ in justifications for intervention, in an attempt to dominate policy debates 
at home. The intriguing difference between these interventions is the context in which 
they were justified. We show that these contextual demands required coalition 
partners to emphasise different secondary justifications for intervention. The article 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of strategic rhetorical balancing, as well as 
potential strategies for resistance.  
 
 
The Language of Intervention: Strategic Rhetorical Balancing and the Tactics of 
Justification 
 
Winning the War of Position through Strategic Rhetorical Balancing 
 
The case studies of Afghanistan and Libya demonstrate the instrumental use of 
language by political elites who are keen to achieve support for intervention.  First, 
while international support is usually desired, domestic support takes priority for a 
majority of western (interventionist) states, as a function of democracy (Holland 
2012b).  Second, this support and the strategy employed to achieve it go beyond 
attempts to appeal and persuade.  Resonance is, of course, important.  However, 
British and American efforts to craft compelling justifications for intervention are 
indicative of a more sophisticated attempt to ensure official narratives win out.  
Building on an emerging critical constructivist literature on rhetorical coercion, the 
argument that we make here is that political elites frame foreign policy in a manner 
that seeks to ensure not only its resonance but also its dominance (see Holland 2013; 
Krebs 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 
2009; Mattern 2001; McDonald and Merefield 2010; Jackson 2011).  Blair, Bush, 
Cameron and Obama have all attempted, to differing extents and with varying degrees 
of success, to dominate debates on intervention.  This dominance is achieved through 
the development of specific tactics of justification, which are employed to fight and 
win a ‘war of position’ (Cox 1983; Gramsci 1971; McDonald and Merefield 2010).  
Our focus here then is unusual in three important senses.  First, we focus on attempts 
to secure acquiescence rather than to appeal. Second, within these strategies of 
coercion, we focus on attempts to close down space through strategic rhetorical 
balancing, rather than attempts at interpellation through invocations of the national 
interest (e.g. Weldes 1996).  And, third, we focus on the important role played by 
secondary justifications within this strategic rhetorical balancing. 
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Considerable literature exists in IR and FPA analysing the role of language in foreign 
policy (e.g. Campbell 1998; Jackson 2005; Larsen 1997).  This literature often 
emphasises the discursive construction of international relations (e.g. Doty 1993), or 
the instrumentality of politicians attempting to win support (e.g. Barnett 1999; Thrall 
2009).  However, while some excellent work has been done on rhetorical coercion 
(e.g. McDonald and Merefield 2010), it currently remains an underexplored and yet 
crucial aspect of foreign policy and intervention.  To date, Ron Krebs’s work 
represents one of the most sustained efforts to develop a constructivist analysis of 
foreign policy centred on the force of rhetorical coercion (e.g. Krebs 2005; Krebs and 
Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2009; see also Mattern 
2005).  For Krebs, political elites attempt to coerce potential opponents rhetorically 
by removing access to those materials required to formulate a socially sustainable 
rebuttal.   Elite tactics of justification then involve the closing down of the discursive 
space that an opponent might otherwise be able to occupy successfully and 
sustainably.  It is about outmanoeuvring and pre-empting those who would proffer 
alternative and resistance, if they were able and had they not lost a ‘war of position’ 
(Cox 1983; Gramsci 1971; McDonald and Merefield 2010). 
 
The fact that the word ‘elite’ appears frequently here is not inconsequential.  While 
important exceptions exist, particularly in the era of 24-hour news coverage and 
public outrage at the violation of human rights norms (e.g. East Timor in 1999), 
interventionist foreign policy is most frequently pursued by those in positions of 
power within society, rather than those less engaged and less interested in world 
affairs. In his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci (1971) noted this important 
distinction between the political elite and population at large, as well as its principal 
differences in distinct political systems.  For Gramsci, the relative ease of the 
Bolshevik Revolution – via a ‘war of movement' – was due to the de-coupled nature 
of state-society relations in Russia.  In contrast, he suggested, the greater connectivity 
of state-society relations in western democracies ensures that opponents of political 
elites must first garner the support of (a more developed) civil society, if they are to 
successfully challenge those with institutional power.  Such a strategy entails a ‘war 
of position’, whereby opponents must build up social capital by crafting competing 
narratives, into which the general population buy.  These shape the “ability to 
imagine” alternatives, as well as perceptions of their feasibility and desirability 
(Crehan 2002, p. 71).   
 
While Gramsci’s attention was turned toward social upheaval and revolution, his 
arguments are certainly of relevance to attempts to understand tactics of elite 
justification.  Political elites attempt to maintain their primacy in a war of position by 
retaining the consent of the population which we argue, in addition to resonance, 
requires the acquiescence of those who might, given a more favourable discursive 
terrain, attempt to craft alternative policy platforms.  In today’s western democracies, 
the political capital accrued from election victories alone is usually insufficient to 
sustain a case for military intervention (Holland 2012b).  Political elites – those in and 
around government – know this, and usually embark upon a particular and often well 
thought out public relations strategy to garner support from those outside of the 
political elite.  Gramsci (e.g. 1971) provides us with a theoretical framework to 
conceptualise this relationship.  Gramsci’s notion of hegemony – as domination 
through a combination of consent and coercion (e.g. Cox 1983) – usefully indicates 
the twin dynamics at the heart of relations between political elites and the general 
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population on matters of interventionist foreign policy.  Of course, here we are 
deliberately cross-contaminating both of Gramsci’s terms (consent and coercion) in 
order to highlight the rhetorical coercion that is part and parcel of efforts to achieve 
‘consent’. Attempts to appeal and to secure acquiescence, we argue, are frequently 
mobilised alongside each other by political elites, in order to achieve policy 
dominance at home.  
 
Alongside efforts to paint a conceivable image of the world when justifying 
intervention, political elites therefore attempt to construct foreign policy in terms that 
make it both communicable and coercive (Holland 2013).  In the first instance, 
political elites are often adept at constructing foreign policy in ways that render it 
communicable, by using language that appeals to particular groups within a domestic 
constituency.  In part, this is why George W. Bush and Tony Blair often sounded so 
different, even when justifying the same interventions (Holland 2012a).  In the second 
instance, political elites often simultaneously attempt to silence or acquiesce those 
who might otherwise adopt an alternative stance.  It is this second strategy – wherein 
political opponents are co-opted through a coercive linguistic tactic – that helps to 
explain the pattern of justification evident in the US and UK, as they intervened in 
Afghanistan and Libya.  It is also this second strategy – of linguistic hegemony – that 
remains a relatively new and therefore under-explored topic of enquiry in IR and 
FPA.  Here, we add an additional theoretical strand to our understanding of such 
strategy, before detailing a new empirical case study, evidencing its importance.  To 
do this, we look beyond (important) invocations of the national identity, considering 
instead the ‘shape’ of justifications of intervention, and in particular instances of 
strategic rhetorical balancing through the emphasis of secondary justifications for 
intervention. 
 
It is certainly true that one of the most common and powerful strategies that elites 
employ to co-opt opponents is the use of the language of national identity and 
foundational values (e.g. Campbell 1998; Mattern 2001).  In the United States, it is 
perhaps members of the Democratic Party more than any other group who have come 
to understand the force of rhetorical coercion, through the invocation of American 
values and identity.  Krebs has traced one instance in what has become an enduring 
strategy of rhetorically draping Republican politicians in the Stars and Stripes (e.g. 
Krebs and Lobasz 2009).  In 2002, the Congressional vote on the use of force in Iraq 
was scheduled to force Democrats to vote prior to their re-election campaigns.  At this 
particular moment, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party had been constructed, in the 
language of the Bush Administration, as a regime of pure evil, which threatened the 
fundamental ‘freedom’ that Americans cherished (Collins and Glover 2002; Jackson 
2005; Silberstein 2002).  To oppose the Bush Administration meant adopting a stance 
that could readily be equated with appeasement, cowardice and a lack of patriotism.  
Portrayed as failing to tackle evil and defend freedom, opponents risked the 
appearance of lacking in love for their country, or even as threatening the very values 
that are seen to underpin the greatness of the American nation.3  Faced with the 
possibility of such a politically debilitating perception, it is unsurprising that many                                                         
3 It would be possible to argue that the War on Terror was perhaps an extreme example of the 
suffocating and oppressive dominance of official discourse, were it not for the similar experience of the 
Cold War.  The publication of lists of dangerous academics during the War on Terror, for example, can 
be seen as a ghostly echo of McCarthyism (e.g. Horowitz 2006).  These academics were supposedly 
threatening the United States through their opposition to government policy. 
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potential opponents opted to contest more minor, procedural issues – troop levels, 
timescales and the like – rather than oppose the decision to intervene in the first place. 
 
While we agree (and have argued elsewhere) that invocations of the national identity 
are of vital importance in achieving support and acquiescence for interventionist 
foreign policies, political elites have undeniably attached considerable (and, at times, 
fundamental) significance to the pursuit of policy dominance through alternative 
tactics.  Policy dominance, we argue, is often (and has recently been) achieved 
through the coercive effects of emphasising secondary justifications for intervention, 
such that they narrow the discursive space from which ‘critical’ voices, inclined to 
alternative arguments, might proffer counter-narratives.  Without such a strategy on 
the part of political elites oppositional counter-narratives would be able to engage the 
primary justifications of elites, undermining them from an entirely alternative angle. 
Political elites seize the rhetorical frames of potential opponents, folding them into 
their own case for war as secondary justifications.  It is this ‘balancing’ of the case for 
war, through the expansion of the justificatory frames of elites and the seizing of 
rhetorical ground, that concerns us here and shapes our understanding of appeals to 
secondary justifications, which initially played a more minor or supporting discursive 
role.  
 
The crafting of a strategically balanced narrative, which appears to account for all 
considerations simultaneously, serves to blunt the rhetorical charges of domestic 
political foes.  In this situation, potential opponents are left to argue about and not for 
their particular rhetorical concern (e.g. the national interest); the debate becomes 
about what is (and what is in) the national interest, rather than an argument for a 
policy that prioritises the pursuit of the national interest (over and above, for example, 
a policy premised on delivering humanitarian goals).  The force of this relegation is to 
manoeuvre opponents into a position where they are more likely to opt (of their own 
volition) for silence, acquiescence or the negotiation of procedure – such as the terms 
and type of intervention – rather than contest the general thrust of policy in the first 
place.  In short, strategic rhetorical balancing, through the emphasis of secondary 
justifications for intervention, helps elites to win a war of position and achieve policy 
dominance at home, thus helping to enable military intervention.  
 
 
Case Study Selection and Methodology 
 
This article analyses two case studies: US/UK interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 
and Libya in 2011.  In the case of the former, this case study is limited to the three-
month period in which principal combat operations were carried out, prior to the 
deployment of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force.  These case studies 
are chosen for three main reasons.  First, the two interventions share a number of key 
features, which helps to render them appropriate as vehicles for the comparison of 
British and American justifications of intervention. Second, they enable a ‘double 
comparison’, in which British and American justifications for intervention can be 
compared: (i) with each other, at two moments in time, ten years apart; and (ii) 
through time, as they evolved over the course of a decade, when faced with new 
circumstances and contexts.  Third, these cases are chosen due to the 
inappropriateness of alternatives: most significantly, the 2003 War in Iraq. 
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On the first, Operations Enduring Freedom and Odyssey Dawn (Operation Ellamy for 
the British) shared the objectives of supporting locals (the United Front/Northern 
Alliance and National Transitional Council and allies), maximising strategic 
advantage through overwhelming aerial supremacy, and minimising the role and 
exposure of coalition troops in the intervention’s initial stages. In Afghanistan, limited 
troop engagement was, of course, a temporary set up; it was also, however, a central 
component of the conflict’s early military strategy. In Libya, the war largely 
progressed in line with the lessons of Afghanistan and the broader War on Terror in 
mind: it was a conflict fought principally through out-of-favour rebel groups on the 
ground, backed by US/UK/NATO air power. And, of course, one of the most 
intriguing questions, in view of limited legal authority, remains the role played by 
coalition special forces on the ground in Libya, who appear to have played a similar 
(if clandestine) role to equivalent forces in Afghanistan, helping to train and guide 
local fighters.  While we could certainly have chosen highly divergent conflicts and 
still gathered legitimate data, this comparison helps to reduce concerns (as much as is 
feasibly possible) that justifications diverge solely due to the distinct nature of the 
impending intervention. 
 
On the second, the selection of these particular case studies enables synchronic and 
diachronic comparisons: between states and over time.  The selection of these case 
studies enables us to bring into direct comparison the strategic justifications of four 
important political elites: Prime Ministers Blair and Cameron, and Presidents Bush 
and Obama.  This double comparison heightens the validity of our empirical analysis 
by enabling us to consider the strategic use of language by two states, in two states. 
Usefully, they also enable us to consider politicians from both sides of the British and 
American political divides. 
 
On the third, these are the only two interventions, meeting the necessary criteria, 
which are broadly comparable.  Only the War in Iraq stands out as a potential 
omission, given the US/UK led military intervention of 2003.  However, first, the 
justifications for this war are situated in a lengthy prehistory of wrangling over 
weapons inspections and UN resolutions, which bias the justifications that were used.  
Second, the scale of this conflict and its nature are markedly different from 
Afghanistan and Libya, with ground forces invading from the south from the 
intervention’s outset.  Third, Bush and Blair (in particular) struggled to convince and 
coerce their respective domestic populations.  Although, on the eve of war, Blair did 
ultimately achieve a majority of support amongst the British populace, this remained 
an incredibly divisive war.  Afghanistan and Libya, on the other hand, achieved broad 
support and acquiescence, enabling us to compare two successful instances of 
rhetorical coercion.  For our purposes, Iraq is important because of its impact on the 
context in which intervention in Libya was justified. 
 
In each case, we focus on the words of Blair, Bush, Cameron and Obama, as the 
principal actors involved in the articulation of foreign policy.  Their institutional 
positions mean that their words carry the most weight, and they stand out as the 
primary mouthpiece of government in voicing the nation’s foreign policy.  By 2001, 
Blair was particularly dominant in the crafting and articulation of British foreign 
policy.  He had also recently won re-election.  Bush too was enjoying what would be 
his highest ever approval ratings in the days and weeks before intervention in 
Afghanistan.  In 2011, Cameron and Obama were both still finding their feet in terms 
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of foreign policy; we therefore afford additional attention to the words of the Foreign 
Secretary and Secretary of State respectively.   In each case, we collected and 
analysed the foreign policy focussed speeches, statements, and press releases of these 
political elites.  We performed a discourse analysis of these speeches, in order to 
classify justifications into two principal categories – those emphasising the national 
interest and those emphasising humanitarian concerns – and a range of subcategories 
(e.g. Fairclough 2000, 2003).  In significant part, this analysis made use of computer-
aided coding and retrieval.  NVivo software facilitated hierarchical coding of national 
interest and humanitarian premised arguments, through a variety of related discursive 
nodal points (e.g. ‘9/11’, ‘regime change’, and ‘human rights’).  Below we select 
quotations that usefully encapsulate broader patterns of justification.    
 
 
Harbouring Terrorists and Humanitarian Assistance: Justifying Intervention in 
Afghanistan 
 
The events of September 11th 2001 conditioned the subsequent American-led 
intervention in Afghanistan in two important ways.  First, intervention was justified 
principally through the language of national security and the avoidance of a second 
9/11; the human rights abuses of the Taliban regime were a secondary and merely 
additional concern.  Nonetheless these concerns served the useful political function of 
helping to quell dissent.  Second, the location of the events of September 11th 2001 
ensured that intervention was primarily justified with recourse to the reestablishment 
of American national security.  Thus, for junior coalition partners such as the United 
Kingdom, strategic rhetorical balancing was required to convince the domestic 
population of the necessity of intervention.  In this task, Blair went out of his way to 
emphasise: (i) the threat to Britain, and (ii) the threat to ordinary Afghans. 
 
 
American Justifications for Intervention in Afghanistan 
 
American justifications for intervention in Afghanistan framed Operation Enduring 
Freedom first and foremost as a ‘War on Terror’, in pursuit of national security, over 
and above humanitarian concerns.  While President Bush was initially cautious in his 
choice of language and phrasing, the notion that the United States was at war quickly 
took hold within the Administration (Woodward 2003).  It did not take long for 9/11, 
initially described by the President as a ‘national tragedy’, to be deemed ‘a series of 
despicable acts of war’ (Bush 2001b, c).  Framing 9/11 as ‘an act of war’ served to 
naturalise and rally support for military intervention but, importantly, it also served to 
heighten the tensions with later humanitarian justifications. 
 
On the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom, Bush asserted that:  
 
America respects the Afghan people, their long tradition and their proud 
independence. And we will help them in this time of confusion and crisis in 
their country (Bush 2001d). 
 
There was, of course, a considerable irony in talk of Afghan independence at a time of 
confusion and crisis, which required US assistance to resolve, when that confusion, 
crisis and loss of Afghan independence was once again arriving, in considerable part, 
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from the act of intervention.  Such tensions in American desires to justify intervention 
with recourse to additional humanitarian concerns were commonplace throughout the 
conflict.  The apparent paradox of marrying humanitarian justifications with the 
principal language of American security was frequently apparent.  On the first 
evening of Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, Bush insisted that American 
forces would simultaneously drop bombs and food:  
 
At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we’ll also 
drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and 
women and children of Afghanistan (Bush 2001e). 
 
This two-track approach of national interest-based counter-terrorism alongside so-
called humanitarian relief efforts continued throughout the early weeks of conflict. 
 
While we are holding the Taliban government accountable, we’re also feeding 
Afghan people (Bush 2001f). 
 
The unifying concept put forward in an attempt to overcome these obvious (and 
potentially debilitating) tensions was the apparent nature of the regime.  Linked 
through the metaphor of ‘harbouring’, Bush conflated Al Qaeda and their Taliban 
hosts to argue that the spectacular terrorism the world had recently witnessed on 
September 11th was the external manifestation of a long history of cruelty within 
Afghanistan.   
 
We have also seen the true nature of these terrorists in the nature of the regime 
they support in Afghanistan - and it’s terrifying. Women are imprisoned in 
their homes, and are denied access to basic health care and education. Food 
sent to help starving people is stolen by their leaders. The religious 
monuments of other faiths are destroyed. Children are forbidden to fly kites, 
or sing songs, or build snowmen. A girl of seven is beaten for wearing white 
shoes. Our enemies have brought only misery and terror to the people of 
Afghanistan -- and now they are trying to export that terror throughout the 
world (Bush 2001g). 
 
Within this framing of the Afghan threat, ultimately the world (or at least ‘freedom-
loving countries everywhere’) and innocent, oppressed Afghan citizens wanted the 
same thing: to say ‘good riddance’ to the regime. 
 
Throughout this battle, we adhere to our values. Unlike our enemy, we respect 
life. We do not target innocent civilians. We care for the innocent people of 
Afghanistan, so we continue to provide humanitarian aid, even while their 
government tries to steal the food we send. When the terrorists and their 
supporters are gone, the people of Afghanistan will say with the rest of the 
world: good riddance (Bush 2001h). 
 
Within the logic of American justifications of intervention then, both the counter-
terrorism and humanitarian missions possessed a mutual aim.  While proclaimed 
desires to end oppression were certainly secondary within American justifications for 
intervention, voices questioning this welcome additional benefit were rendered scarce.  
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It is important to clarify that we understand secondary justifications not in opposition 
or addition to ‘real’ reasons (although others might wish to make that claim) but as 
distinct from and often receiving less (initial) attention than primary justifications. 
Frequently, secondary justifications chronologically follow primary justifications, in 
their articulation, level of prominence and the degree of emphasis they are afforded.  
Through their (later) incorporation into the interventionist frames of elites, however, 
these secondary justifications take on an importance in enabling policy through the 
rhetorical coercion of potential opponents that belies their denotation as ‘secondary’.  
While a minority of oppositional voices did recall Afghanistan’s long history of 
repelling invaders, the notion that oppression justified action prevailed, even if pursuit 
of the national interest was the principal justification for intervention (e.g. Shepherd 
2006).  This is evidenced in the records of the Witness and Response Collection of the 
Library of Congress.  Interviews with ‘ordinary Americans’ reveal (humanitarian) 
concerns that were initially apparent – fears about the moral equivalency of killing 
innocent Afghans, for example – were slowly downplayed, in line with the Bush 
Administration’s increased emphasis on the humanitarian rationale for war (Holland 
2009).  While this strategic rhetorical balancing was unlikely to be fundamental to the 
prosecution of intervention (due to the upwelling of public support for intervention in 
pursuit of the national interest), it was certainly useful in curtailing the concerns of 
potential (ethical) objectors.   
 
 
British Justifications for Intervention in Afghanistan 
 
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly adept at 
reminding sceptics that their calls not to intervene would constitute de facto support 
for an oppressive regime.  Following the ‘major combat operations’ of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, Blair reminded doubters: 
 
… for goodness sake, let’s rejoice in what has been achieved, and let’s realise 
too that the victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan wasn’t just a military 
victory, it was a political victory. People in Afghanistan have been liberated 
from one of the most vile and oppressive regimes in the world (Blair 2002a).4 
 
There was undoubtedly a greater balance between realism and moralism in British 
justifications for intervention than American counterparts.  Blair’s use of 
humanitarian arguments reflected the political logic of responding to the events of 
9/11.  Notwithstanding Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,5 it was not a 
straightforward claim that Britain had a role to play in a coalition intervention that 
constituted a response to events in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania.  With this 
in mind, Blair took far greater efforts to achieve two important rhetorical manoeuvres.  
First, Blair emphasised that the British national interest was engaged in fighting and 
winning a war against terrorists and their state sponsors in Afghanistan. 
 
                                                        
4 Blair would later come to repeat these arguments in post hoc justifications for intervention in Iraq, 
reminding those who opposed his decision that, had they got their wish, they would live in a world 
where Saddam Hussein continued his reign of terror over millions of Iraqis.   
5 Requiring NATO members to come to the support of any member who is attacked by an external 
adversary. 
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I also want to say very directly to the British people why this matters so much 
directly to Britain. First let us not forget that the attacks of the September 11th 
represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. 
The murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack 
upon Britain. But even if no British citizen had died it would be right to act. 
 
… the al-Qaeda network threatens Europe, including Britain … we have a 
direct interest in acting in our own self defence to protect British lives (Blair 
2001a). 
 
Second, rather than a mere ‘additional’ justification, Blair insisted that arguments on 
the ‘humanitarian side’ of intervention were just ‘as important’ as those ‘on the 
military side’.  This emphasis was such that the coalition’s raison d’être became 
humanitarian provision: 
 
We have established an effective coalition to deal with the humanitarian crisis 
in the region … Our priority has been to re-establish food supply routes into 
Afghanistan (Blair 2001b). 
 
Like Bush, Blair spoke frequently and at length about the human rights abuses of the 
regime, but he went further in his insistence that the ‘humanitarian coalition’ would 
deliver on the ‘humanitarian front’ in the face of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ (2001a, b, c). 
The emphasis on helping ordinary Afghans was noteworthy although perhaps to be 
expected from a leader who had steered New Labour’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ 
towards his own ‘doctrine of international community’; a variant that, whilst saturated 
with the language of morality and human rights, was most obviously defined by its 
focus on intervention (see Blair 1999; Holland 2012b; Lawler 2000).  Emphasising 
the engagement of the British national interest and humanitarian rationale reflected 
Blair’s broader political project and the demands of the domestic political context.  
Rhetorical balancing had already served Blair well in framing domestic policy 
(Holland 2012b); in the realm of foreign policy, accentuated appeals to secondary 
rationale helped to silence doubters and co-opt potential opponents.  For instance, ‘the 
leader of the Opposition, Iain Duncan Smith, supported the Government’s position’ 
repeatedly prefixing approval with, ‘as the Prime Minister has said’ (HCRP 2001; HC 
Deb 4/10/2001; HC Deb 8/10/2001).  Emphasising the national interest was important 
in achieving the support of an opposition party not long separated from the overt 
realpolitik of Malcolm Rifkind, while bold rhetorical contrasts made opposing Blair’s 
apparent quest to defend human rights appear cold-hearted and cowardly.  In 
Afghanistan, as he admitted when recalling justifications for intervention in Kosovo, 
Blair sought a strategic rhetorical balancing to ensure victory in the war of position at 
home (Blair, cited in Coughlin 2006, p. 104). 
 
 
R2P and Regime Change: Justifying Intervention in Libya 
 
The context of a lamented War on Terror, juxtaposed with the optimism of the Arab 
Spring, conditioned intervention in Libya in two important ways. First, in contrast to 
Afghanistan, intervention was justified primarily on humanitarian grounds; national 
interests were a secondary justification that nonetheless served an important political 
function. Emphasising the national interest was an attempt to outflank potential 
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critics.  Second, and relatedly, the domestic and international context made 
articulating a clear and consistent position on regime change particularly challenging. 
Secondary desires to avoid the complete alienation of Russia and China combined 
with the principal concern of political elites: to ensure potential domestic opponents 
were denied material for the formulation of a successful counter-argument. This 
concern was especially acute given the fertile landscape provided by public distrust 
following the Iraq War. Alongside a reduced commitment to nation-building, the 
implication of this immediate political context and the broader political fallout of the 
War on Terror was that ‘regime change’ was pitched as a desirable indirect 
consequence (not explicit end goal), attached to a solely humanitarian cause.   
 
 
American Justifications for Intervention in Libya 
 
The impact of this new domestic context on justifications for intervention took two 
principal forms.  First, Obama’s apparent hesitancy led to one of his own advisors 
labelling American strategy as ‘leading from behind’.  Despite the riposte from the 
President that the US leads ‘from the front’ (Lizza 2011), the Obama Administration’s 
initial caution was plain to see.  For instance, although clear on the desirability of 
regime change – insisting Gaddafi had ‘lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do 
what is right for his country by leaving now’ (Obama 2011a) – Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton initially refused to commit the United States to enforcing a no-fly 
zone and explicitly ruled out unilateral action (Clinton 2011a).  Second, the Obama 
Administration was nonetheless forthright in its humanitarian arguments from the 
outset of the unfolding crisis, playing up the notion and importance of an altruistic 
policy. One month prior to the implementation of UNSCR 1973, Clinton and Obama 
condemned ‘outrageous and unacceptable’ Libyan human rights abuses: 
 
The Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow 
humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its 
people. It must be held accountable for its failure to meet those 
responsibilities, and face the cost of continued violations of human rights 
(Obama 2011b). 
 
Now is the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed (Clinton 2011b). 
 
At this stage intervention was clearly justified with recourse to a humanitarian 
rationale.  However, by the end of March, when Obama delivered the definitive 
statement of US policy, he was careful to justify intervention with reference to both 
values and interests: 
 
… we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many 
challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a 
responsibility to act (Obama 2011c). 
 
Significantly, Obama also clarified how US strategic interests were at stake, referring 
to the negative consequences of refugees fleeing Libya and putting a strain on the 
transitions in neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia. He added that if Gaddafi had been 
allowed to remain in power this would have encouraged other dictators, undermined 
the credibility of the UN, and ‘would have carried a far greater price for America’.  
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This is a common rhetorical strategy in placating doubters of an intervention’s merit.  
The message is clear: act now, to avoid spending more treasure and spilling more 
blood in the future.  
 
In justifying intervention, however, the American national interest always remained a 
secondary argument to that of Gaddafi’s actions and America’s calling to put an end 
to them.  Despite playing up American interests, Obama argued that intervention was 
nonetheless first and foremost about realising America’s unique responsibilities to 
fellow humans: 
 
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – 
our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances 
would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a 
blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is 
different. And as President, I refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and 
mass graves before taking action (Obama 2011c). 
 
The second major point to note is that, despite insisting Gaddafi should leave, the 
Obama Administration avoided calls for a policy of regime change.  Throughout the 
intervention, Obama was at pains to emphasise that what had been done was in 
support of a popular uprising against Gaddafi, a leader who had forfeited the right to 
lead his people.  But by the end of March, in the context of post-Iraq America, regime 
change had become controversial and a potential rallying point for political 
opponents.  On the one hand, the likes of John McCain and Joseph Lieberman 
‘call[ed] for a strategy in Libya that identifies and achieves U.S. interests and includes 
the ouster of Gaddafi’ (Liebermann and McCain 2011).  On the other hand, Obama 
faced a backlash from his own party, as well as Democrat and independent voters, 
who felt he was returning America to the policies of George W. Bush.  With the likes 
of McCain and Liebermann far more supportive of intervention in the first place, 
Obama had to placate the second group.  He did so by suggesting that regime change 
would be welcomed, but was not American policy towards Libya.  He was explicit in 
stating that: 
The task that I assigned our forces – to protect the Libyan people from 
immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone – carries with it a U.N. 
mandate and international support. It’s also what the Libyan opposition asked 
us to do. If we tried to overthrow Gaddafi by force, our coalition would 
splinter. We would likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish 
that mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air. The dangers faced by 
our men and women in uniform would be far greater. So would the costs and 
our share of the responsibility for what comes next (Obama 2011c). 
Obama was equally clear that the changed context of 2011, in contrast to that of 2001 
and 2003, was central to his thinking, language and policy:  
To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq … That is not something we can 
afford to repeat in Libya (Obama 2011c). 
 
The refusal to give explicit voice to a policy of regime change through military means 
had important implications for the nature as well as possibility of intervention.  First, 
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it served as a useful justification for the adoption of a broadly ‘Afghan model’ of 
intervention, with a remote warfare strategy which, once it was over, allowed Vice-
President Joe Biden to claim as a measure of success that America ‘didn’t lose a 
single life’ (Biden 2011).  Second, it alleviated the pressure of calls for America to 
stay-the-course, after major combat operations had ended. Third, and most 
importantly, however, it helped to silence those who were most outraged at America’s 
pre-emptive and unilateral policy of regime change in Iraq (see, for example, 
Friedman 2011).  Obama’s justification for intervention denied these potential 
opponents resources they could have otherwise used in crafting an effective and 
socially sustainable rebuttal. 
 
 
British Justifications for Intervention in Libya 
 
As with the United States, the two principal features of the British case for 
intervention in Libya were: (i) the strategic rhetorical balancing of calls to protect 
civilians with the language of the national interest; and (ii) the downplaying of regime 
change, such that it was framed as an indirect humanitarian outcome, rather than an 
explicit political aim. Like Obama, Cameron was clear that regime change would be 
welcomed.  However, it was only later that talk of regime change was tempered; in 
the early stages of justifying intervention, Cameron was far bolder in his calls for 
Gaddafi’s ousting: ‘Col Gaddafi’s regime must end and he must leave’; ‘this is an 
illegitimate regime that has lost the consent of its people, and our message to Col 
Gaddafi is simple: go now’ (Cameron 2011b). At this stage, Cameron insisted the 
‘murderous’ regime would ‘face the justice they deserve’; the message was one of 
military action, to topple Gaddafi and avert the very ‘real danger … of a humanitarian 
crisis inside Libya’.  It was only later that Cameron would bring his language into line 
with the lack of public appetite for such a policy, in the wake of Iraq, and the 
restricted terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 sanctioning the intervention.  
At this stage, Cameron balanced calls for regime change through military means with 
calls for intervention on humanitarian grounds.  This positioning left Cameron’s 
opponents little room for manoeuvre.  During parliamentary debate on the issue of 
intervention, the Leader of the Opposition was rhetorically co-opted.  The use of overt 
humanitarian reasoning, within the structures and norms of international society, 
made opposition difficult, helping to ensure the support and/or acquiescence of 
potential opponents, with key political foes concurring whole-heartedly: 
 
I think that the whole House will endorse the Prime Minister’s view that the 
only acceptable future is one without Colonel Gaddafi and his regime. We 
welcome what the Prime Minister said about a possible no-fly zone. We also 
welcome the international isolation of Libya expressed in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1970, including sanctions and an arms embargo, and the 
decision to refer the killing of protesters to the International Criminal Court 
(Miliband 2011). 
 
However, as the bombing campaign commenced, the contradiction between the 
civilian protection mandate from UNSCR 1973 and the government’s declared 
position that Gaddafi should go led to questions being raised as to whether Gaddafi 
himself could be the target of airstrikes. After struggling to overcome this tension, 
Cameron eventually articulated the following position: 
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… our role is to enforce that UN Security Council Resolution. Many people 
will ask questions … about regime change … I have been clear: I think Libya 
needs to get rid of Gaddafi. But, in the end, we are responsible for trying to 
enforce that Security Council resolution; the Libyans must choose their own 
future. 
 
The UN Resolution … explicitly does not provide legal authority for action to 
bring about Gaddafi’s removal from power by military means … but our view 
is clear: there is no decent future for Libya with Colonel Gaddafi remaining in 
power’ (Cameron 2011c). 
 
In other words, like Obama, Cameron’s later justification fro intervention in Libya 
avoided openly articulating a direct political desire to see Gaddafi ousted.  The UK’s 
political objective may well have been the removal of Gaddafi, but it was not astute to 
openly articulate it as such.  Talk of ‘regime change’ had raised the spectre of Iraq in 
British political discourse.  As the bombing of Libya progressed, the toxicity of the 
term ‘regime change’ became increasingly apparent.  Conservative Member of 
Parliament John Baron, for example, was outspoken in opposition to the apparent 
Anglo-American mission creep.  First, he explicitly linked interventionist policy in 
Libya to that of the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Second, he argued that 
while the intervention in Libya ‘was justified on humanitarian grounds’, what the 
west had actually pursued and delivered was ‘the longest assassination attempt in 
history’ (Baron 2011).  These reasons explain why, even if ‘carrying out the UN 
resolution and forcing out Gaddafi [were] pretty much the same thing’ – they were 
‘coterminous missions’ – the British Government had ‘to pretend that they are 
separate’ (see d’Ancona 2011).  In this, the British Government was surprisingly 
successful.  The appearance of an indigenised conflict – a civil war in which Britain 
was neutral beyond a mandate to protect civilians – led Ban Ki-moon (2011) to 
proclaim: ‘changes of regime were done by the people, not by the intervention of any 
foreign forces’.  
 
The second interesting component of Cameron’s rhetoric for our purposes was his 
invocation of the British national interest to balance a humanitarian case for war. We 
do not argue that Cameron believed the national interest was unengaged; we neither 
claim to know nor require such knowledge for our analysis.  Rather, we argue that the 
national interest was, at least in part, invoked in order to silence those sceptical of an 
intervention designed solely to ‘save strangers’.  Replicating Blair’s arguments on 
Kosovo twelve years earlier, Cameron asserted that: 
 
If Gadaffi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya will once again become 
a pariah state, festering on Europe’s border, a source of instability, exporting 
strife beyond her borders. A state from which literally hundreds of thousands 
of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure on us in Europe 
(Cameron 2011a). 
 
And, cutting to the heart of arguments centred on realpolitik, Cameron spelt out for 
the British public why the UK had to take action: 
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We must remember that Gaddafi is a dictator who has a track record of 
violence and support for terrorism against our country and against Scotland 
specifically. The people of Lockerbie … know what he is capable of 
(Cameron 2011a). 
 
His efforts to balance the humanitarian rationale for intervention could hardly have 
been blunter: 
 
I am clear: taking action in Libya is in our national interest and that’s why 
Britain, with our allies like America and France, and alongside the Arab 
world, must play our part in responding to this crisis (Cameron 2011a). 
 
In this rhetorical balancing, Cameron sounded Blairite, repeating the trick of enforced 
acquiescence through a targeted tactics of justification.  On the one hand, the 
language of defending human rights ensured the majority of backbench Liberal 
Democrats and Labour MPs supported government policy.  On the other hand, 
attempts to play up the engagement of the British national interest helped to limit 
criticism from within the Conservative Party and quell support for seemingly 
legitimate counter-arguments such as those of John Baron.  In short, strategic 
rhetorical balancing helped Cameron to win the war of position and deliver a 
dominant interventionist policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Politicians act instrumentally in choosing to justify interventions with recourse to 
particular arguments.  These efforts go beyond attempting to ‘sell’ policy at home.  
Rather, since 9/11, political leaders in the US and UK have employed a ‘tactic of 
justification’ that seeks to quell dissent, silence doubters and secure the acquiescence 
of potential opponents. In addition to its (primary) empirical contribution then, the 
article’s (secondary) theoretical contribution centres on the identification of a crucial, 
often unacknowledged, form of rhetorical coercion: strategic balancing.  While 
appeals to the national identity dominate processes of rhetorical coercion and their 
study, rhetorical balancing is a crucial additional component of crafting coercive 
policy, capable of winning out in the battle to justify intervention.  In this war of 
position, political leaders pursue a strategic rhetorical balancing of the principal 
rationale for intervention, in order to deny others access to the discursive space and 
materials they would require in order to formulate a socially sustainable rebuttal.  
American and British justifications for intervention in Afghanistan and Libya most 
certainly made use of the language of national identity and appeals to notions of 
foundational values under threat.  However, in these case studies, strategic rhetorical 
balancing meant that Blair, Bush, Cameron and Obama all emphasised secondary 
motivations for intervention, in an effort to close down the political terrain from 
which a rhetorical counter-offensive could be launched.   
 
In Afghanistan, Bush spoke of dropping ‘bombs’ and ‘food’ in order to quell those 
voices most loudly comparing and equating the events of 9/11 with the human toll 
that the invasion of Afghanistan would inevitably reap.  Likewise, Blair’s emphasis 
on the rationality of intervention, as assessed against the threat to British territorial 
sovereignty and the national interest, can and should be read as an instrumental 
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attempt to silence and secure the acquiescence of those critics who would most 
readily otherwise question British involvement.  In the case of Libya we see the same 
underpinning logic of rhetorical coercion, which inspired Obama to balance the 
humanitarian case for intervention strategically with recourse to the national interest, 
and instrumentally curtail public rhetoric on regime change.  While both Obama and 
Cameron gave voice, principally, to humanitarian concerns they also felt the need to 
play up the strategic interests that Libyan instability impinged upon.  These concerns 
were emphasised primarily to placate those who most feared the costs of another war, 
following the quagmire of Iraq. Thus, while the Libyan example reverses the 
emphasis of justifications on display in 2001, the logic of rhetorical coercion holds 
true.   
 
The implications of this persistent logic are worrying, both at home – concerning 
issues of democracy and bipartisanship – and abroad – in terms of the nature of 
international intervention.  Our concerns here centre on the impact of strategic 
rhetorical balancing on: (i) the possibility, nature, effectiveness, and ethicality of 
intervention, if it is shaped by the demands of domestic coercion; and (ii) the health of 
the marketplace of ideas, if the suffocation of alternative policies is a central 
component of achieving policy dominance in a democracy.  While our argument and 
use of the phrase ‘balance of rhetoric’ makes no attempt to map onto theories 
pertaining to a ‘balance of power’, it is certainly true that power is crucial here.  
Rhetorical coercion, at its most effective, can lead to an imbalance of power within 
the domestic politics of an interventionist state.  This imbalance can lead to hegemony 
in the production of interventionist discourses, suffocating potentially less violent 
alternatives.  We fear that pursuing a war of position through coercive tactics of 
justification helps to drown out (useful and often more effective or principled) policy 
alternatives.  We therefore offer a threefold strategy of resistance. A rebalancing of 
rhetoric might usefully be informed by: considerations of the longue durée (beyond 
political short termism); expansion of the fractures in divergent coalition framings; 
and/or, the immanent critique of justifications wherein policy fails to deliver on 
promise.  These strategies of resistance should follow further research on rhetorical 
coercion generally and strategic rhetorical balancing specifically.  
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